![]() He had no intention of looking the other way because “the 1930s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war.” To that end, he announced the “initial steps” that the United States was taking. Kennedy described the Soviet action as “a clear and present danger” not just to the United States but to the entire Western Hemisphere. He added that Gromyko had sat in the Oval Office four days earlier and lied to his face that Moscow had not sent offensive weapons to Cuba. The president told the American public that the United States had discovered “ unmistakable evidence” that the Soviet Union had begun installing nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba in “flagrant and deliberate defiance” of both treaty obligations and Soviet assurances to the contrary. The speech had gone through five drafts and took eighteen minutes to deliver. He responded sharply: “ Ask the Secretary… you can judge for yourself.”Īt 7:00 p.m., Kennedy addressed the nation from the Oval Office. Reporters hanging out at the State Department noticed the Soviet ambassador’s agitation and pressed him on why. The letter stated Kennedy’s position bluntly: “ the United States is determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed.” Dobrynin departed Rusk’s office after just twenty-five minutes looking unnerved and clutching copies of the speech and the letter. embassy in Moscow handed the Soviet Foreign Ministry a copy of the speech that Kennedy planned to give one hour later along with a letter from the president to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Dobrynin arrived at the State Department at 6:00 p.m. Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, an urgent summons for a meeting. ![]() Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament meeting of the National Security Council did not have to do a last-minute rewrite of Kennedy’s speech. To Kennedy’s relief, however, it turned out that the “important statement” was a goodbye from Gromyko. Had the Soviets learned that the administration had uncovered their secret and were now seeking to preempt the president’s speech? That would create political problems at home and diplomatic problems abroad for the White House. Kennedy’s strategy had hinged on being the first to announce the presence of the missiles to the world. Kennedy received a scare just before noon when Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko delayed his return flight to Moscow and the Soviet mission to the United Nations announced that he would make an important announcement. He also spoke by phone with British prime minister Harold Macmillan, while former secretary of state Dean Acheson met with French president Charles de Gaulle in Paris to convey the administration’s message. The lawmakers who made it to the White House got a personal briefing on the crisis from Kennedy late that afternoon. ![]() ![]() Those congressional leaders who weren’t in Washington were told to catch commercial flights or special flights arranged by the U.S. Twenty leaders from both parties were told that the president wanted to speak with them that day. Administration officials spent the bulk of that Monday, the seventh day of the crisis, briefing cabinet officials, members of Congress, and foreign leaders about the situation. ![]()
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